As stated in the Preface above, fulfilling my unrequited curiosity about the deglacial history of Vermont for me has a long time history . Now, finally, with this study I have some sense of closure, not that I see this as the final word on the matter. As I have repeatedly stated, I see this report as a beginning, presenting multiple hypotheses for further study. My goal is to help current and future researchers to see possible directions for further research, and to underscore the relevance of this not just to deglacial history but as well to global warming.
As noted, my report was developed using the assumption of the applicability of the “Bath Tub Model.” As to the validity of these findings, also as noted above, proof, meaning real proof, is elusive in the natural sciences, as discussed for example by Frodeman(1995) 1 Frodeman, R.(1995), Geological Reasoning: Geology as an interpretive and historical science; GSA Bull., V 107, pp 960-968. and others. As stated above, such proof comes in several major ways, based on: 1) the preponderance of the evidence; 2) hypothesis formulation and testing; and 3) the possibility that some of the Vermont ice margins may have a unique “signature” that enables correlation and thereby development of deglacial history independent of the “Bath Tub Model.”
Conceptually, the preponderance theory suggests that the validity of findings in geologic matters is supported not by any kind of rigorous litmus test or mathematical proof but by overwhelming multiple arguments, which is not unlike the legal arguments made by lawyers in their closing statements in many cases. Preponderance comes from having many puzzle pieces fitting together in a reasonable and rational way that makes plausible, convincing sense. In legal cases whether or not this has been accomplished requires a jury, which for geology comes from peer review. But even juries are known to sometimes be wrong. I believe that many puzzle pieces are brought together here in a compelling way, but as is the nature of such matters, this type of “proof” is never complete or finished, but instead merely provides more clues for further study.
At some point reasonable and rationale people who study such matters can come together to collectively agree on the preponderance of the matter. This concurrence is reflected in the concept of peer review, which is the equivalent of the jury in the above legal analogy. As has been stated, peer review has not been done here. The subject of peer review takes us to the concept of paradigms, which are repeatedly referred to herein, with reference to paradigm shifts and “traps.” Paradigm shifts practically assure negative response from peers. 2 I remember, when I was in undergraduate school, hearing about Professor Harry Hess’ theory of “continental drift.” This was the early days of what came to be known and widely accepted as Plate Tectonics. Poor Professor Hess was widely ridiculed. And now, how that thinking has changed. Peer review is a necessary but not always a sufficient or effective test of the validity of any findings. I would submit first that just as the findings reported here have not been peer reviewed, so too is the case for much of the body of research reports on the Vermont Pleistocene from the past 50+/- years. And second that when looked at objectively, in my opinion, the reliance on existing, flawed paradigms, most especially my own, has limited our understanding of deglacial history. We can see this, for example, in the reports by Chapman, Stewart and MacClintock and as well my own (Wagner,1972).
An argument can be made that it is premature to be exploring deglacial history, that what is needed first is more fact finding. I infer that this might be an argument made by those who have been working in the field in Vermont for the past 40-50 years, and even before in previous generations of researchers Many such reports are marvelous fact-finding documents. They reflect an enormous amount of careful work, amassing a great amount of detailed information. But in general, whereas they make inferences about receding ice margins, lowering of ice sheet levels, etc., they do not attempt to examine deglacial history by the explicit identification and correlation of ice margin features – which I submit is key to a full understanding of deglacial history.
I would argue that the attempt to examine deglacial history by the formulation of testable hypotheses which synthesize such evidence is not only a) beneficial as a matter of the very nature of geology as a discipline in the natural sciences, but b) is necessary as a means of giving direction to the fact finding, to enable the establishment of “proof” and c) by not doing so squanders an opportunity to more effectively advance our understanding of deglacial history.
To compound the matter further, as reflected by the quote by Terry Pratchett on the frontispiece of this report: “Stories of imagination tend to upset those without one.” I already have experienced such upsettedness, which I regret. Peer review at best is a necessary, vital, but tricky and imperfect business.
This entire issue of fact finding, scientific advancement, and the nature of scientific study generally falls within the domaine of scientific philosophy. ChatGPT offers the following:
The philosophy of science has long grappled with the extent to which scientific knowledge depends not only on empirical observation but also on the cognitive, conceptual, and perceptual frameworks of the researcher. This question touches on issues of objectivity, interpretation, and the very nature of scientific truth.
1.Theory-Ladenness of Observation
Philosophers such as Norwood Russell Hanson (1958) and Thomas Kuhn (1962) argued that observation is not neutral but is shaped by prior theories and conceptual commitments. Hanson’s phrase “seeing is a ‘theory-laden’ activity” captures how even simple observational acts depend on what the observer expects to find. Kuhn extended this to paradigms—shared conceptual frameworks within which normal science operates—suggesting that data are interpreted within the constraints of these paradigms. This challenges the notion of a purely objective empirical base.
2.The Researcher’s Cognitive Framework and Bias
Scientific inquiry is influenced by cognitive and perceptual factors inherent in human reasoning. This includes confirmation bias, selective attention, and interpretive framing. Philosophers like Karl Popper emphasized falsifiability as a methodological safeguard against such biases, but even falsification presupposes a conceptual lens through which hypotheses are constructed and tested. Modern philosophy of science, influenced by cognitive psychology, acknowledges that the scientist’s mental models play an active role in shaping scientific reasoning.
3. The Hermeneutic and Constructivist Perspectives
Post-positivist and constructivist thinkers such as Paul Feyerabend and Michael Polanyi emphasized the tacit dimension of knowledge—what Polanyi called “personal knowledge.” According to Polanyi, all knowing has a personal component rooted in the scientist’s skills, intuitions, and judgments. Similarly, Feyerabend argued that strict methodological rules cannot capture the creative and context-dependent nature of discovery. These views emphasize that the scientist’s mental engagement and interpretive imagination are not distortions but necessary components of discovery.
4. Objectivity Reconsidered
While earlier traditions sought to separate the observer from the observed, later philosophy of science reframed objectivity as a social and procedural ideal rather than a purely psychological state. Helen Longino (1990) and Sandra Harding (1991) proposed “contextual empiricism,” in which objectivity arises from critical interaction among diverse perspectives. In this view, the individual mind of the researcher remains subjective, but scientific communities can achieve objectivity through openness, criticism, and methodological pluralism.
5. Implications for Scientific Practice
Understanding the mental and interpretive dimensions of research has practical implications. It encourages reflexivity—awareness of one’s own conceptual biases—and promotes interdisciplinary dialogue to counteract the limits of individual cognition. It also aligns with contemporary approaches in science and technology studies (STS), where the social, psychological, and cultural dimensions of scientific reasoning are analyzed as integral to knowledge production.
References
– Hanson, N. R. (1958). *Patterns of Discovery*. Cambridge University Press.
– Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. University of Chicago Press.
– Polanyi, M. (1958). *Personal Knowledge*. Routledge.
– Feyerabend, P. (1975). *Against Method*. Verso.
– Longino, H. (1990). *Science as Social Knowledge*. Princeton University Press.
– Harding, S. (1991). *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?* Cornell University Press.
Further, in the subject of the philosophy of science one finds a riddle, about whether to believe is first to see, or conversely to see first requires believing. For me, this resonates with my own experience, which can be summed up quite simply. In my early years when I first began my research on the Pleistocene of Vermont, I was a stubborn, young cuss. I believed that my scientific education in Geology had prepared me as an expert, that I knew all about the discipline that was to be known, such that in doing my research in Vermont, all I had to do was apply my expertise to basic mapping. How foolish I was! In retrospect this seems like academic arrogance and hubris. But no, in fact I was a member of the in-group among my peers. We studied, sometimes argued, but in the end enjoyed a glass of wine together on felsenemeer capped mountains, as both friends and colleagues, with a sense of mutual respect. Nevertheless, looking back I see that I spent almost 14 years of very hard work, and yet in the end was unable to report on the most basic issue for a large area of Vermont, meaning the deglacial history itself, the changing positions of the receding ice sheet. In retrospect I was in error, my mind was not as open as it could and should have been. I could have identified many of the same types of features I have come to understand by this present VCGI mapping. I actually walked in Ice Marginal Channels in the Belvidere area, recognizing them as being significant but not exploring their meaning. I mapped Ribbed Lacustrine deposits in the Hinesburg and Monkton areas but similarly failed to address how they formed. Such ice margin features were not in my mental scientific toolbox. I could see the evidence in front of my face, but could not or would not fit these into my preconceived conceptual model about what I believed ice margins looked like. Or, failing that, to revise my model. I squandered an opportunity to learn. I could have applied better thinking to my mapping and thereby accomplished so much more. My mapping could have been so much more productive. Instead, I slavishly toiled away in my uber-self confidence, and only now see the implication of the Believing is Seeing, versus Seeing is Believing riddle.
I would conclude by saying that all of this is the basic nature of our science and we researchers as humans. There is no good, proper, or correct answer to any such reflections. At this point I am gratified that my curiosity has finally been satisfied. I see the findings presented here as intriguing. They reflect a large 3 D, time transgressive puzzle, with many puzzle pieces and many missing pieces. These pieces now mostly fit together, offering a kind of “proof” of the validity of the interpretations offered. But of course this report is a beginning, not a final word. This report actually only sets the next stage, a second part of proof in geology, for the testing of hypotheses by further more focused investigations, especially field work. As by now should be clear, this report is an invitation for the further exploration of the many as yet unresolved hypotheses, which is to say for further research.
Thus, the intent of this report, as so stated on the title page, is to be provocative. This report explores the deglacial history of Vermont, which has led to the development of new paradigm-ic hypotheses, which are offered here as an invitation to others to continue the exploration. The basic evidence which has served as the basis for the findings and interpretations given here is reviewed in this report, but is most fundamentally contained in the VCGI online map. Whereas this map presently is accessible by anyone with an online link, which I can provide, VCGI plans to upgrade their system within the next year or so. Unfortunately, the present VCGI system will then become incompatible with the new upgrade, and thus my VCGI map will no longer be available. My plan is to make a copy of this map as a pdf, which will require stitching together many screenshots, using software such as Photoshop. This in itself is a tedious job. If accomplished I can provide a copy of this composite of the VCGI map to any who have an interest, by the email address given above. However, I keep putting this task off because almost every day I have new thoughts, which take me back to the VCGI map, resulting in further changes. Such is the learning process!
Finally, I am very aware that this report is overly long, tends to ramble, could be substantially condensed into a more concise essence, and likely contains mistakes, which I would like to think are in format only and not content. But this last thought, no doubt, would be naïve. Having collaborators work with me on this as I originally hoped would have helped on both fronts. But, here it is. Good luck!